Editing Bahnsenburner

== Vagon and Sye ==
<span style="font-size:14px;">http://web.archive.org/web/20101018033707/http://debunkingatheists.blogspot.com/  18 Oct.2010 various links and posts </span>

http://web.archive.org/web/20101018033927/http://debunkingatheists.blogspot.com/2008/12/evolution-gets-owned.html?commentPage=2

Series of posts/replies an induction etc. between [[Bruggencate]] and Vagon



http://web.archive.org/web/20120716091410/http://bahnsenburner.blogspot.com/2010/08/critique-of-sye-ten-bruggencates.html

'''NOTES: '''
* 1 - Induction like the laws of logic cannot be observed or demonstrated, only be used.
* 2 - Induction implies knowledge about the future. From Genesis we know that the seasons, sun rises etc. will be like the past because God ordained it as such by saying so - that makes it so. Only because of God's divine will, shall the sun rise tomorrow.
* 3 - Not being able to justify reasoning in the world means any knowledge claim is inconsistent with what one professes to believe, and inconsistency undermines reason.
* All of science is based on 'induction,' basically stated that 'the future will be like the past.' Induction cannot be accounted for apart from God. To say "The future will be like the past, because it has always been like that in the past," is entirely circular.
* Again, it is true wholly apart from the revelatory aspect, by the impossibility of the contrary. Or, in other words ;-) if the Bible were not true, ‘truth’ itself would be without meaning. How God works in us such that we accept the truth of His Word, rather than reject it, I don't know.
* ''I have read the word and personally find it to be untrue.”''<br /><br />And what is the standard by which you measure the ‘truth’ of Scripture? See, if it is only your opinion, you have vested interest in coming to that conclusion.<br /><br />''” Please describe the process by which the written word became infallible truth to you.”''<br /><br />It did not ‘become’ infallible truth to me, the infallible truth of the Bible is the necessary '''precondition''' of intelligibility. 
* Facts do not  give us the capacity to reason, and arrive at truth, facts can only be such as determined by reasoning, thus we must know that our reasoning is valid (paraphrase of 19 dec 2008, 7:58)
* Biblical infallibility is a necessary precondition for intelligibility 
* <br />[http://web.archive.org/web/20101018070109/http://www.blogger.com/profile/05695428662014842212 Sye TenB] <span style="font-style:italic;">"Denying logic, includes denying the law of non-contradiction. If the law of non-contradiction does not necessarily apply, then by denying logic, you are actually affirming logic, since contradictions are allowed."</span><br /><br />[http://web.archive.org/web/20101018070109/http://www.blogger.com/profile/05695428662014842212 Sye TenB] <span style="font-style:italic;">"As far as science goes, science is dependent on the uniformity of nature, or no scientific prediction could be made. Problem is, no atheistic worldview can account for the uniformity of nature, the very foundation of science."</span>
* <br />[http://web.archive.org/web/20101018070109/http://www.blogger.com/profile/05695428662014842212 Sye TenB] <span style="font-style:italic;">The way that a transcendental claim is refuted is to demonstrate that claim is not the necessary precondition for the thing claimed, i.e. to demonstrate that God is NOT the necessary precondition for the laws of logic. You cannot show evidence for the necessary precondition of evidence, cause then it wouldn't be the necessary precondition of evidence!</span>




<pre>
"Now, back to my question, where did you observe ‘induction?’

Look at your own post, you can observe induction.
    December 18, 2008 5:42 PM 
Sye TenB said...
Vagon said: ” Look at your own post, you can observe induction.”
Cool, I can see that the future will be like the past, in my post? Show me where!!
</pre>

Vagon said: ” Not exactly. You cant see the future, but you can conclude somethings will be extreme probable.”

Great, show me how!!!

”In this case you have informed me that you can jump down 3 metres, based on the fact you had "done it many times".

That’s me using induction, that isn’t induction. Please, show me induction, I had gotten my hopes up :-)




'''DESCARTES''':
Dave W. said...
ye wrote:
"Problem is, your conclusion is assumed in P1. To avoid question begging, P1 should be: “Doubting is going on somewhere in the universe.”"
<pre>
Dave W. said: ”But I know that I can doubt”

How do you know you exist, and not that there is just some random doubting going on in the universe?

” (your questions about the reliability of my reason imply that you agree that I can doubt, otherwise you wouldn't have asked)”

I believe that you exist, and that you can doubt, I’m asking how YOU know you exist. You have told me that you can have certainty without God. I ask you for one thing that you know for certain, and how you know it, and this is what I get:

”Well, that's your problem, Sye: you've oversimplified to the point of absurdity. You've never given this any thought (how could you?), which is why you have denied my reasonable answers to your questions.”

I have shown how ‘Dubito ergo sum’ is question begging, but tell me, is there anything else you are claiming to know other than that you exist? If so, what is it, and how do you know it? 
</pre>
----
Vagon said: ”Sye now that you have observed induction and shown that you use it, why don't you apply it to your religion?”

I have not observed induction, but I do apply it, as I can account for its validity, why you do, or would, apply it, is something you have yet to tell us.

----
Vagon said: ”Apologies, by seen I assumed you meant observed.”

What’s the difference?

”You cant see induction because it is not an object.”

Ah, so this: ” Science works from induction, which is the only observable thing that for all intents and purposes is considered "truth"" is bogus.

” you can however observe the process, as you have done.”

Nope, I haven’t even seen the process, I have only used it. As you have correctly stated, induction involves inferring future results from past results, and I have never seen the future.

I asked: ” Is inductive reasoning valid btw?”

You answered: ”Yes”

How do you know? How do you know that the future will be like the past?

----
Sye: That I can account for absolute truth, does not mean that I have absolute knowledge.

----


”Please show where I indicated you could you could observe the future.”

You did not. You said that I used induction, which as you stated involves ‘probable conclusions’ which implies knowledge about the future.

”I indicated you could observe induction and you and everyone else that has read your post can observe you using the process of induction.”

But neither they, nor I have seen induction. At best they have witnessed me using inductive reasoning in one instance, which does not have anything to do with any other instances, unless you care to make the connection for us.

I asked: “How do you know inductive reasoning is valid? How do you know that the future will be like the past?

You ‘answered:’ ”A reason to doubt an outcome is not a reason to reject the outcome in of itself.”

Never said that it was, Now, back to my question, how do you know that the future will be like the past?

----
Vagon said: ” In this case it is not your assumptions it is the action of jumping down 3 metres several times. They are the facts and from them you conclude that you will be able to produce similar results.”

Yes, but I have a basis for expecting this uniformity, a God who controls the universe, on what basis do YOU proceed with the expectation that the future WILL BE, or will even probably be like the past?

”I type on my keyboard and the letters will appear on the screen.”

How do you know about the future?

”If you did, you would know that prayer is not heard and that would invalidate your religion, as your religion claims that it is inerrant in all facets.”

Huh? Prove that prayer is not heard?

----
CT said: ”And yet you didn't. Dan started an evolution based thread and you went right back to epistemology. “

And in his Dec 18, 2008 12:14 AM post, he called Andrew a “Nanny” for complaining about the direction the thread was going.

”Evolution only attempts to account for the diversity of life on earth. That's it.”

Does it attempt to give a true account of what happened? If not, why should anybody waste any time with it? If it does, '''''I'd like to know how evolution gives us the very thing it is trying to attain.'''''


''continue'' - December 18, 2008 8:44 PM (thread goes on from here)



=== Conceding the point ===
Unethical Sum Thin said: ”My point is that, in a discussion on evolution, where does it matter from where logic and reason originate if we all agree that we have the ability to utilize them?”

'''Sye: Simple – evolution cannot give us the very basis for a ‘discussion on evolution.’ Discussing evolution absent that concession, would be to concede at the outset.'''

”If all you want to do is discuss epistemology, you should probably confine yourself to threads that are more focused on your topic of choice.”

Sye: I suppose we should leave that up to Dan eh? Besides, I want to know how evolution accounts for ‘truth.’ That is what I asked, way back when, but the question was avoided. If you care to debate that, I’d be pleased to engage you.

"Quite frankly, it's annoying."

I can imagine ;-)

Dave W. said: ''” It doesn't need to. Evolutionary theory doesn't seek to explain "truth."''

Sye: Never said that it did Dave. I said that it cannot account for truth, so arguing about it absent that account, lends it credence it does not warrant.

=== Andew ===
Andrew said: ”so if one can't justify reasoning in the world, then what?”

Then any knowledge claim is inconsistent with what one professes to believe, and inconsistency undermines reason.

== Vagon ==
http://bahnsenburner.blogspot.com/2010/08/critique-of-sye-ten-bruggencates.html

We're going back a time now but here's a post I made over at weAreSMRT not regarding Sye specifically.
http://wearesmrt.com/bb/viewtopic.php?f=17&t=609
And here again talking with "scmike" a pesupper in the comments on Comforts blog:
https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=5823596693953871104&postID=4322938360313106509
When I request a positive ontology, thats the questioning of the immaterial.
I should point out that I probably would say these days that I do have certainty in that it is contextual. So I let the ball drop :)
I doubt you'll find specifically the wording you used in any case but the underlying principles are there.
In any case I'll try to find the convos I've had with Sye specifically.
August 29, 2010 11:03 PM


----
Van Til, Richard Pratt, and their latter-day followers.
Friday, August 27, 2010
A Critique of Sye Ten Bruggencate’s www.proofthatgodexists.org
A visitor to my website recently informed me about a debate he had on Premier Christian Radio with a presuppositional apologists named Sye Ten Bruggencate.
I’ve seen Sye’s website before (it is located here: http://www.proofthatgodexists.org/). On this site, Sye seeks to prove the existence of his god by leading visitors through a series of pages which present various alternatives regarding the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality. The first four steps ask the visitor to affirm whether or not the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality even exist. If at any point the visitor disaffirms the existence of one of these features, he is taken to a page which reminds him that he makes use of what he has denied on a daily basis. So the visitor is compelled to affirm the existence of the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality.

At Step Five the visitor is asked to decide whether those laws, whose existence he has just affirmed, are “immaterial” or “material.” It is at this point that I think Sye’s proof begins to suffer its most profound problems. The alternative “immaterial” versus “material” strikes me as a false dichotomy, since “immaterial” only tells us what something is not, not what it is. This negative term is contrasted with its positive counterpart, namely “material,” suggesting that these are the only two options available. The descriptor “immaterial” has no positive meaning of its own and could refer to just about anything one imagines (for according to Christian apologist Peter Pike, imaginary things are “immaterial” – see here). Sye’s case might raise fewer suspicions if his question at Step Five asked whether the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality were material or not material. This correction would improve things two-fold: first it would undo the mistake of treating “immaterial” as if it had a positive meaning; also, it would generate a question which Sye seems unprepared to ask: If the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality are not material, then what are they? It would be erroneous to suppose that calling them “immaterial” satisfies this question.

By framing the alternatives in the manner which he chooses, Sye seeks to tip the scales artificially in favor of his desired conclusion. But we will find that, even though he does this to give his position an advantage, it does not work. Let’s explore the two alternatives as Sye understands them.

If we click the box in Step Five which says “Laws of logic, Mathematics, Science, and Absolute Morality are Material,” we are scolded with the following statement:

If you believe that laws of logic, mathematics, science, or morality are made of matter, please show me where in nature these laws are. Can you touch them, see them, smell them, hear them, or taste them? Rather than have you produce a material, physical law I will narrow down the field for you... just show me the number '3' somewhere in nature. Not 'three things,' not a written representation of the number 3 but the real physical, material number 3.

Statements like this strongly suggest that Sye has something *conceptual* in mind when he speaks of “the immaterial.” This is because his example of something “immaterial” is the number ‘3’, which in fact is a concept (Sye disqualifies objects in the quantity of three and symbolic representations). This raises yet a further question about the terms in which Sye chooses to inform his proof:

Why doesn’t he frame his question about the ontology of the laws of logic, mathematics, science and absolute morality in terms of conceptual versus material instead of “immaterial” versus material?

The reason why Sye does not cast the alternatives in these terms is most likely because (a) he probably has no conceptual understanding of logic, mathematics, science and morality, and (b) doing so would jeopardize his case for theism. Not only does Christianity not have a theory of concepts (which would explain why Sye does not treat these issues as conceptual phenomena), his god is not supposed to be merely a concept, but an independently existing being.

The problem is even worse for Sye. As noted above, at Step Five Sye contrasts “material” with “immaterial.” Another expression which he uses to designate “the immaterial” is the term “abstract entities.” Does Sye really want to say that his god is “abstract” in nature, like the number 3 or any other abstraction? I wouldn’t think so. Abstractions are not living entities, they have no consciousness of their own, and they are not independently existing entities: they require minds to form and make use of them. But the Christian god is supposed to be an independently existing entity possessing its own consciousness, not needing a mind which forms it (such as in the believer’s imagination).

So just by citing a concept as an example of something “immaterial,” Sye is letting on that “God” refers to something psychological rather than existential, to something in his mind rather than an independently existing entity. Concepts are products of a mental process. By characterizing both “God” and concepts as “immaterial,” Sye is saying that his god is analogous to products of a mental process. Only instead of constituting genuine knowledge about the world (as in the case of concepts formed on the basis of perceptual input), Sye’s god-belief finds its residence in his imagination.

If at Step Five we click the box which says “Laws of Logic, Mathematics, Science and Absolute Morality are Immaterial,” we are taken to Step Six, which has us decide whether these laws “are universal or up to the individual.” Again we seem to have a false dichotomy on our hands. Sye asks: “Does 2 + 2 = 4 only where you are, and only because you say it does, or is this a universal law?” Sye implies that something must be universal in order to be what it is independent of our personal dictates and circumstances. But I’m sure that Sye would agree that this is not the case. In contrast to universal laws and truths, particular objects exist independent of our conscious intentions, and our actions in regard to them show that we recognize this, albeit perhaps only implicitly.

At any rate, most will likely agree (and rightly so) that the equation 2 + 2 = 4 (assuming equivalent units) applies everywhere and not just in one specific location and not just because we might happen to say it does. If this is what is meant by universality in this context, then one can agree that the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality apply everywhere and are thus universal in this sense. (I have presented the proper understanding of universality in my blog Demystifying Universality.)

Before proceeding with Sye’s proof, however, it should be noted that Sye contrasts “universal law” with something being the case because someone says so. This is noteworthy for it is in the theistic worldview where we find the view that a consciousness has the power to speak things into existence and alter them according to its will. Sye keeps this aspect of his theism safely out of view while suggesting that such a position is antithetical to universality as such in the dichotomy he introduces at this point.

If we take the option at Step Six which affirms that the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality are indeed universal, we are then asked at Step Seven to affirm whether or not those same laws unchanging. Sye summarizes how far we’ve come once we’ve made it this far in his proof:

You have acknowledged that laws of logic, mathematics, science, and absolute morality exist, that they are not made of matter, and that they are universal. The next question is whether you believe they are changing or unchanging.

We are asked to decide whether or not, on our own view, the law of identity, for instance, or 2 + 2 = 4, man’s need for values, etc., can be altered in some way or another, either on its own or by means of some external force. Of course, there’s no good reason to suppose that these laws will do this, we do not experience them changing, and the idea that they could or would change seems entirely self-refuting. Indeed, what would cause the laws to change? But causality is one of those laws. To expect a cause to change the laws invokes the laws. But couldn’t they change without a cause? No, because causality is the identity of change; if there’s change, that change – because it exists – would have identity, and thus the law of causality would be in play.

Apologists like Sye, however, think that this state of affairs implies or entails the existence of a god which makes this state of affairs – namely the immutability of the laws in question – obtain, or at any rate that this would not be the case unless their god were real. Of course, with reasoning such as this, we are still left with imagining the god in question, and projecting it as the solution to what may in fact not be a problem at all in the first place (I say this because we have The Axioms and the Primacy of Existence). Besides, presuppositionalists do not make a very clear case for why their god is a necessary precondition for the existence, universality and immutability of the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality. In fact, it seems that these laws imply the very opposite: that the very notion of a god is completely arbitrary, even antithetical to them.

At this point, we come to the ”preproof” page in Sye’s case, where he announces:

To reach this page you had to acknowledge that immaterial, universal, unchanging laws of logic, mathematics, science, and absolute morality exist. Universal, immaterial, unchanging laws are necessary for rational thinking to be possible. Universal, immaterial, unchanging laws cannot be accounted for if the universe was random or only material in nature.

We saw above that characterizing the laws in question as conceptual in nature – i.e., as generalized identifications composed of concepts – is vastly preferable to characterizing them as “immaterial,” which ignores their conceptual nature and leaves them subject to whatever arbitrary investment one’s imagination may ascribe to them. In fact, recognizing that these laws are conceptual in nature explains the remaining two attributes: universal and unchanging. Universality is essentially the open-endedness of conceptual reference. For instance, the concept ‘man’ includes not just one man or five men, but all men who exist, who have existed and who will ever exist. It is because of this open-endedness that we can speak of men in the past and in the future as well as in the present, and still have the same essential features in mind – i.e., a biological organism possessing the faculty of reason. Concept’s owe their open-endedness of reference to the process of measurement-omission which is a key aspect of concept-formation, an action performed by the mind. There’s no mystery here, so there’s no reason to attribute universality to something beyond man’s own mental abilities.

Similarly with the attribute of immutability: conceptual reference rests on the proper orientation of the subject-object relationship and the process by which concepts are formed. The orientation between consciousness (the subject) and its objects does not change; the subject and its objects do not and cannot switch places. Moreover, the truth of the axiomatic concepts ‘existence’, ‘consciousness’ and ‘identity’ do not change. For instance, the fact that there is a reality (“existence exists”) does not change. The immutability of conceptual reference is thus grounded in facts, facts which do not conform to conscious intentions, facts which obtain regardless of the actions of any consciousness (whether real or imagined).

So in a sense, just by preferring to characterize these laws as “immaterial” instead of conceptual, Sye has stacked the deck against their real nature in order to underwrite them with theistic presuppositions which have no basis in reality whatsoever, and which in fact violate the very axioms which ground those laws in the first place.

Sye says that these laws “cannot be accounted for if the universe was random or only material in nature.” But they can be accounted for if the universe exists independent of consciousness (the primacy of existence ensures this), if the axiom of consciousness is true (there are organisms which possess the faculty of consciousness), and if one has a theory of concepts which explains how conceptualization is possible. And we have all three of these in the philosophy of Objectivism.

Meanwhile, Christianity defaults on all three of these points. For one thing, it holds that the universe does not exist independent of consciousness. It holds to the primacy of consciousness, claiming that the universe was created by an act of consciousness, and that its contents conform to the dictates of that consciousness (to its “will”). Moreover, Christianity in essence denies the axiom of consciousness, for it must assume that consciousness can exist without an independent object (see my blog Before the Beginning: The Problem of Divine Lonesomeness). Lastly, Christianity has no theory of concepts, which means its adherents have no philosophically native means of understanding the nature of concepts or the processes by which the human mind forms them.

It is because of these fundamental problems that I wager that Sye’s proof ultimately relies on an argumentum ad ignorantium - an argument from ignorance. It is primarily because one lacks knowledge of the axioms, the issue of metaphysical primacy and concept theory that one would seek to exploit the resulting mysteriousness of the nature of the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality and attribute them to the “supernatural”.

Sye continues, saying:

The Bible teaches us that there are 2 types of people in this world, those who profess the truth of God's existence and those who suppress the truth of God's existence. The options of 'seeking' God, or not believing in God are unavailable. The Bible never attempts to prove the existence of God as it declares that the existence of God is so obvious that we are without excuse for not believing in Him.

Sye must appeal to the contents of a storybook in order to affirm the antithetical categories into which he wants to fit all men. In doing so, he seeks to wipe out the sheer honesty of many non-believers: those who honestly do not believe any mystical claims, including the claim that a “God” exists. It is honesty which is the casualty of such pronouncements, and this is what we need to understand. If Sye’s proof were built on honesty, why does it seek to exploit ignorance in such a predatory manner? Blank out. Again, he appeals to the storybook, acknowledging that it presents no arguments for the existence of its god, but rather “declares” – i.e., merely asserts, without argument – its existence, claiming (with blatant contradiction at Romans 1:20) that its existence is “so obvious that we are without excuse for not believing in Him.”

What the bible offers, and what Sye repeats here, is essentially an accusation against non-believers. This is one of the oldest tricks in the book: if someone doesn’t believe your claims, accuse them of some moral shortcoming. In this case, we’re accused, given our non-belief in Sye’s god, of purposely “suppressing the truth.” The allegation here is that we are willfully and deliberately denying something that we really know to be true. But again, neither Sye nor any other apologist has any rational basis for making such a charge. He cites no facts or evidence to support his claim; rather, he simply repeats what the sacred storybook already says. The passage where he gets this comes from the apostle Paul. Paul wrote this passage some 1900 years ago, long before anyone reading this was even born. In other words, we were accused of this moral breach before we even existed, without trial, without a hearing, without weighing any evidence, without any investigation into any of our souls.

Essentially, we have the theist saying, “Well, if you do not confess that my God exists, then I’m going to accuse of denying what you really know!” This is somehow supposed to compel us. Who would want people to believe his claims on such a basis? Wouldn’t that make one’s own confidence in said belief all the more shaky? It is noteworthy that apologists want to make the issue a moral matter. Are they not tipping their own cards by doing so? Are they not tacitly admitting that their god-belief is ultimately a matter of choice by telling us that we’re immoral for essentially choosing not to believe? Should we just up and choose to believe that Sye’s god exists, with no reason other than that we do not want to be guilty of his charge of “suppressing the truth”? Should we just retreat into our imaginations on Sye’s say so, on the basis of fear of the imaginary consequences of the alternative, and agree with his claim that his god is needed for any proof in the first place?

I trow not.

So it appears, upon inspection, that what Christians really mean by “believe in Him” is nothing more than “imagine Him.” For no matter what the apologist offers in defense of his god-belief, we still have no alternative to imagining his god which he insists exists.

This conclusion bears out in the claim which Sye presents as his “proof”:

The Proof that God exists is that without Him you couldn't prove anything.

This hardly constitutes any kind of proof. Indeed, it seems merely to be the opinion of someone who already believes the claim that said god exists in the first place. In fact, I see no reason why someone who believes in the Muslim god could not make essentially the same claim about his god:

The Proof that Allah exists is that without Him you couldn’t prove anything.

To bring the point home, we could imagine any god in place of Sye’s “God” and wonder why it would not stick for that god for the kinds of reasons Sye supposes it works for his god:

The Proof that Blarko exists is that without Blarko, you couldn’t prove anything.

I’m guessing that Sye would not find these latter two variations on his own them very compelling.

Finally, after all the steps in Sye’s presentation are exhausted, we come to the question what do you believe? We are given only two options at this point:

“I believe that God exists”
and
“I do not believe that God exists”

If we choose the first option, Sye finally rewards us by taking us to his site’s main page, where he asks visitors who have not gone through his eight-step program to go to his proof’s first step. For those who made it here by following the desired alternatives of Sye’s proof and choosing the “I believe that God exists” path, Sye writes:

For those who have gone through the proof to get here, it may have been a huge step to finally admit that God exists. While it may be a relief to finally make such an admission, it is just the first step, not the last.

He apparently thinks it requires a lot of courage to “admit that God exists,” even though after going through Sye’s proof we still have no alternative but to imagine the god whose existence he’s been trying to prove. Nothing has changed in this regard: before Sye’s proof, we could only imagine his god, and now that he’s presented his 8-step proof, we can still only imagine it. We cannot perceive this god, we cannot conduct a conversation with it, we cannot verify its existence by asking it to reveal itself in some unmistakable, demonstrative manner (such as levitating a book from the book shelf – something that should be easy for the creator of the universe to do). True to presuppositional form, Sye’s god remains marooned in our imagination, even after all his gyrations about absolute truth, the laws of logic and universality. Indeed, while I went through the steps of Sye’s proof, I never experienced any compulsion to “admit that God exists.” Rather, I sensed only that our leg was being pulled.

But Sye makes it sound like “admit[ting] that God exists” lifts some terrible burden off our shoulders. But there was no burden there in the first place. There is no strain in recognizing the fact that there is a fundamental distinction between what is real and what is merely imaginary. In fact, if there’s any “relief” to be achieved, it is in grasping the nature of this fundamental distinction and “admitting” that the imaginary is not real, even if Sye’s god doesn’t like it. But surely even Sye Ten Bruggencate recognizes the fact that there is a fundamental distinction between what is real and what is imaginary, does he not? If so, why then does his proof show no concern for this fact? Why does Sye not tell us how we can distinguish between his god and what is merely imaginary? Why does he not build any safeguard into his proof which ensures that the god whose existence he wants to prove is not something we set up in our imagination as we go through its several steps? And if he were to build such a safeguard into his proof, how would it integrate with the terms of his proof, and how would it affect its intended conclusion? We may never know.

If we go through Sye’s eight-step proof and choose the latter option, namely “I do not believe that God exists,” Sye will naturally be disappointed. Only stubbornness and hardheartedness could lead one to choosing this option. It is by choosing this option that we are lead to a new page where Sye scolds us yet again. There he writes:

Denying the existence of God is not unbelief but an exercise in self-deception. You may know things, but you cannot account for anything you know.

Is it truly an instance of “self-deception” when one recognizes the fact that there is a fundamental distinction between what is real and what is imaginary? Indeed, it seems that ignoring this distinction is a telltale indication of self-deception, and I have yet to see how god-belief is possible without downplaying this distinction. If something does not exist, then how can denying its existence when someone insists that it does exist, constitute an instance of self-deception?

Sye betrays the inherent argumentum ad ignorantium nature to presuppositionalism when he tells us “you may know things, but you cannot account for anything you know.” He grants that his visitors can know things, but essentially says that they don’t know how they know what they know. How does he know this about those who visit his website? Is he omniscient? Does he confuse himself with the god he claims he worships? He may have never made their acquaintance before, and yet he professes to know that they can’t know how they know what we know. He apparently takes his website’s visitors for fools.

Perhaps Sye is expressing a hope here, namely the hope that his visitors are unable to “account for anything” they might happen to know. But why would he hope this? Or perhaps he’s projecting his own ignorance here. Either way, he seems to think he’s on safe grounds here, since he provides no support at all for his claim about people who may very well be complete strangers to him. He talks about being able to “account” for one’s knowledge, but presents no basis to “account” for the knowledge he claims for himself about people he’s never met. Sye is telling us that the basis for his visitors’ knowledge is a mystery to them. And yet isn’t this precisely what Christianity ends up teaching about the “knowledge” believers are supposed to claim for themselves when push comes to shove? Look at what presuppositional apologist John Frame tells us when he wrestles with the question of how the believer can “account for” the “knowledge” he is supposed to claim for himself:

I cannot explain the psychology here to the satisfaction of very many. In this case as in others (for we walk by faith, not by sight!) we may have to accept the fact even without an explanation of the fact. Somehow, God manages to get his Word across to us, despite the logical and psychological barriers. Without explaining how it works, Scripture describes in various ways a “supernatural factor” in divine-human communication. (a) It speaks of the power of the Word. The Word created all things (Gen. 1:3, etc.; Ps. 33:3-6; John 1:3) and directs the course of nature and history (Pss. 46:6; 148:5-8). What God says will surely come to pass (Isa. 55:11; Gen. 18:149; Deut. 18:21ff.). The gospel is “the power of God unto salvation” (Rom. 1:16; cf. Isa. 6:9-10; Luke 7:7ff.; Heb. 4:12). (b) Scripture also speaks of the personal power of the Holy Spirit operating with the Word (John 3:5; 1 Cor. 2:4,12ff.; 2 Cor. 3:15-18; 1 Thess. 1:5)10. Mysterious though the process may be, somehow God illumines the human mind to discern the divine source of the Word. We know without knowing how we know. (Presuppositional Apologetics: An Introduction - Part 1 of 2: Introduction and Creation)

Frame construes the problem as a matter of psychology, but what we’re really after here (and what Sye is presumably interested in) is a matter of epistemology, not psychology. For what we’re supposed to be concerned with is giving an “account for” the knowledge we claim to have, right? So this in itself is quite an admission on Frame’s part: it tells us that he has no epistemological “account for” the “knowledge” he claims to have acquired from a supernatural source. And that would be accurate: knowledge that is dispensed from a supernatural source would have no epistemological basis, since it would not be knowledge which one infers from previously validated knowledge, but which would have been forcibly inserted into his mind by means of irresistible magic.

And this analysis is not at all uncalled for: Frame admits that the bible fails to “explain… how it works,” but mentions that it involves some kind of “power,” a power which is powerful enough to “direct… the course of nature and history” (so how could puny little man resist it?). This “power” is something which “operat[es] with the Word” which the believer reads in the sacred storybook, so just by reading the storybook the believer is supposedly giving this power access to his mind to do whatever it chooses to do. Frame himself concedes that he does not understand how this all works, calling the “process” by which this power inserts knowledge into the believer’s mind “mysterious,” insisting that “somehow” his god “illumines the human mind to discern the divine source of the Word,” while failing to explain how this supposed illumination is any different from the believer’s own imagination. It is at this point that Frame throws up his arms in utter cognitive resignation to make the damning admission “We know without knowing how we know.”

This is the philosophical heritage of presuppositional apologetics. And yet, given this concession of defeat on a most important epistemological matter (indeed, the most important matter for the believer if there were any!), Sye wants to exploit the non-believer’s supposed inability to “account for” what he knows. Presuppositionalists have always told us that non-believers cannot “account for” their knowledge, so Sye tells us nothing we haven’t already heard. But if accounting for knowledge were in fact so important to Sye, why doesn’t he make up for Frame’s admitted defeat and get down to the business of accounting for his own so-called knowledge, beginning with explaining how we can reliably distinguish between what he calls “God” and what he may merely be imagining?

The silence on these points is indeed deafening!

But if Christians can give themselves a pass when it comes to giving an “account for” their knowledge and ultimately appeal to “mystery,” why is it an issue of the non-believer is unable to articulate the epistemological grounding of his own knowledge?

Perhaps it is because – and this is what we should expect if Christianity were in fact false – Christianity has no genuine epistemology, and non-believers – who claim no supernatural source for the knowledge they have – should have an epistemological basis for the knowledge they have, since they acquire their knowledge through processes governed by the nature of their consciousness and its perceptual contact with reality. In other words, while believers should not be expected to provide any epistemological accounting for the knowledge they claim to have about “the supernatural” (since such “knowledge” is summarily arbitrary in nature), non-believers do not claim to acquire their knowledge from some “supernatural” source, but instead rely on their own faculties to discover facts, formulate general principles and infer higher-level truths through some understandable process. So the Christian is right on schedule in giving himself a pass, since he has no “account for” the knowledge he claims, and he is clever in challenging non-believers to explain how he acquires the knowledge he has.

But this does not in any way justify the believer’s appeal to “mystery” or some “supernatural power.” By taking this route, the believer announces that his god-belief rests ultimately on his own ignorance: he has no idea how to “account for” knowledge at all, and yet it is on the basis of this ignorance that he hopes to establish the validity of his god-belief. The circular tail-spin of crash-and-burn presuppositionalism leaves its practitioners stranded on a deserted island, unable to fend for themselves, unable to do nothing more than rest on the futile hope that some unsuspecting victim will come along and fall for his pretenses.

That being said, it is true that many non-believers do find it difficult to wrestle with presuppositionalism’s devises and challenges. There are, among others, two fundamental reasons why this may be the case. For one, while individual thinkers do have a great store of knowledge in their minds, they typically do not learn the processes by which they acquire knowledge in an explicit, systematic manner. They started learning knowledge when they were toddlers, and just continued with the processes that they naturally developed over time, never really understanding how their knowledge relates to what they perceive, never exploring how they form a concept, never identifying the process by which they can infer general truths from what they are aware of directly. Since their childhood, the processes by which they acquire their knowledge has been automatized, something they do without fully understanding how they do it. In this way, many non-believing thinkers’ orientation to their own knowledge is no different from what Frame indicates about the religious knowledge he claims when he concedes that “we know without knowing how we know.”

The solution to this is not what the presuppositionalist offers, which is to retreat further into the cave of his religion’s darkness, but to recognize the fact that since consciousness and knowledge both have identity, they can both be understood, since knowledge is essentially a process of identifying that which has identity. This is where Objectivist epistemology, the objective theory of concepts, sheds light where presuppositionalism can only prey on ignorance. (For details, see Ayn Rand’s Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology.) I contend that, without a theory of concepts, one will be unable to answer presuppositionalism’s challenges in any definitely resolute manner.

Sye’s next statement is noteworthy:

Arguing against God's existence would be on par with arguing against the existence of air, breathing it all the while.

It’s curious that Sye would compare “arguing against God’s existence” with “arguing against the existence of air,” for his proof makes it clear that his god is supposed to be immaterial while air is undeniably material in manner. We do in fact breathe air, and can feel it rushing into our lungs and out our noses as we breathe. We can directly sense air, since our air channels are equipped with nerve endings which register the passage of air as it moves across them. But the Christian god is supposed to be immaterial, invisible, and beyond the reach of our senses. It’s said to be “out there” some place, but without any ability on our part to perceive. All we can do is imagine it (which we aren’t supposed to talk about). So Sye’s comparison of his god with the air that we breathe, is at the very least highly questionable. If Sye could say this about his god, couldn’t we say this about anything we imagine?

Sye then says:

    You use the universal, immaterial, unchanging laws of logic, mathematics, science, and absolute morality in order to come to rational decisions, but you cannot account for them.

How does Sye know that we “cannot account for them”? If we have the objective theory of concepts, we surely can “account for” logic, mathematics, science and morality, since these are conceptual in nature. Indeed, how could these endeavors be possible to any consciousness lacking the ability to form concepts? Blank out! Sye certainly does not explain this. He does not even consider this question. I have already discussed the proper understanding of universality (see here). Universality is essentially nothing more than the human mind’s ability to form open-ended classifications of reference (namely mental integrations) into which new units can be integrated when they are discovered or considered. There is nothing mysterious about universality when it is understood as an aspect of conceptual awareness. But notice that presuppositional apologetics does not encourage an *understanding* of universality, but instead seeks to utilize universality as a point of ignorance against the non-believer.

Similarly with the quality of being “immaterial”: since Sye is talking about universality, he’s clearly talking about the mind’s ability to formulate open-ended classifications of reference. But the mind does not experience its own activity in the same manner that it experiences the concrete entities which it perceives in the world. The mind acts according to its own nature, and this activity is certainly different from the nature of the objects of which one is aware by means of sense perception. A tree which one perceives is different from the concept ‘tree’ which one forms in his mind to integrate and identify the many trees he perceives.

Sye continues:

These laws are not the only way God has revealed himself to you, but they are sufficient to show the irrationality of your thinking, and expose your guilt for denying Him.

The “laws” to which Sye refers here, if they have any objective basis, are not the means by which an invisible magic being “reveals” itself to human beings, but in fact the conceptual form in which human minds identify and integrate general truths which they discover about the world in which they exist. There’s nothing otherworldly about these laws. In fact, they pertain in this world precisely because they are formed on the basis of what is discovered in this world. The reason why religious thinkers treat them as indications of a supernatural dimension is precisely because they do not understand their inherent relation to this world, which again implicates the argumentum ad ignorantium nature of presuppositional apologetics: the apologists do not know how the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality can be derived by the human mind from their awareness of the world around us, therefore they couldn’t possibly be derived from awareness of the world around us. Consequently, they must derive from some awareness alien to this world, they must derive from a supernatural mind. After all, goes the reasoning, this world is nothing but matter in constant flux, particulars that are ever-changing. So how could these laws, which are “immaterial,” unchanging and universal find their basis in this world? If such reasoning were true, how could these laws have any applicability in this world if they didn’t have any basis in it? Again, to address such questions, apologists appeal to the supernatural: because the laws reflect the nature of a supernatural being, and the supernatural being created this world (this world which is a chaos of particulars constantly undergoing change). Still we are left with imagining something beyond what we perceive, beyond what we can infer from an objective basis, beyond what we can reach by means of reason. You just have to have faith in the apologist’s claims that the defense he gives for his god-belief is true, for it will never make sense on the basis of reason.

Sye’s presumptuousness seems to know no bounds when he writes (again, he’s writing this to whoever happens to visit his website and finds his way to this page):
There is a reason that you deny the existence of God and it has nothing to do with proof. I can show this to you. Examine what your initial reaction was to the proof of God's existence offered on this website. Did you think that you could continue to deny God because you are not a scientist, or philosopher but 'Surely somewhere, sometime, a philosopher or scientist will come up with an explanation for universal, immaterial, unchanging laws apart from God?' Did you try to come up with an alternate explanation on your own? OR Did you even consider that the proof was valid?

The problem with Sye’s proof is not whether it is valid or invalid. Validity is a formal concern in logic; one can produce a valid argument that the earth rests on the back of a giant tortoise swimming through space. The question is whether or not Sye’s argument is sound, and this should be his concern. It should be our concern as well, for even if we object that Sye’s argument is invalid, it would not take a lot of effort to make it valid, and then what? The concern should be whether the premises in Sye’s argument are true as well as whether or not they in fact support his intended conclusion. On this note, Sye’s argument does not make it clear how the conclusion that his god exists follows from the premises that the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality are “immaterial,” unchanging and universal. He insists that such laws “cannot be accounted for if the universe was random or only material in nature” (Sye makes this claim on the pre-proof page). But it does not follow from this that his god therefore exists. Nor does Sye’s claiming that these laws “reflect the very nature of God” given their so-called “immaterial,” universal and unchanging nature (as he does here). It is one thing merely to claim that these laws “reflect the very nature of God,” another thing entirely to prove (a) that said god exists and (b) that the laws in question actually do reflect its nature. Sye has merely presented the claim that they do (thus assuming the existence of his god, which is what he was supposed to prove in the first place); he has not at all come close to accomplishing the latter tasks.

Notice Sye’s glaring presumptuousness in speaking on behalf of his visitors, most of whom he will never personally meet. How does Sye know that any given reader’s reason for rejecting the claim that his god exists has nothing to do with proof? Presuppositionalists are constantly asking non-believers to “account for” their knowledge; why doesn’t Sye “account for” what he claims to know here? It could be that readers find Sye’s “proof” deficient (they’d be right to do so), and this would be sufficient to reject its conclusion. Sye says that he can show that his readers’ rejection of the claim that his god exists by examining their initial reaction to his website. But even Sye does not know what his readers’ initial reaction to his website may be. That he does not know this is given away by the fact that he must ask his readers questions in order to probe for those reasons. Sye notes several possible initial reactions, but hardly provides an exhaustive list. It could be that his readers came to his website with a willingness to let Sye make his case, and upon examining his case found it to be insufficient to the task he put before himself. It may be the case that some readers are simply being honest when they examine Sye’s case and find it surreptitious or deceptive. Would Sye fault any of his site’s visitors for being honest?

Sye clearly wants to forestall any alternative to his god-belief:

Hoping that an alternate explanation for universal, immaterial, unchanging laws can someday be found apart from God, is a blind leap of faith, or wishful thinking. Isn't it interesting that this is exactly what professed unbelievers accuse Christians of?

In other words, Sye chides putting hope in what merely be imaginary as an alternative to putting hope in what believers can only imagine. A leap of faith in favor of some mystical concoction of human imagination which starkly departs from the realm in which we exist is to be preferred over man’s potential when it comes to what he may produce in the future (human beings have quite a track record, from the Empire State Building to the Declaration of Independence).

But all of this is for naught, for we already have a rational explanation for the universal, unchanging and objective laws which Sye has in mind. And that explanation is found in the philosophy of Objectivism. (If what he presents to us on his site is any indication, it appears that Sye has no familiarity with this philosophy; he certainly does not interact with it.) So there is no need to “hope” that “someday” an “alternative explanation” can be “found apart from God” (as if positing “God” explains these things to begin with!). No “leap of faith” is required, either for some imagined future explanation or for some supernatural deity which one can only imagine. No “wishful thinking” is needed.

And yes, hoping, leaps of faith, and wishful thinking, are indeed the kinds of things non-believers observe Christians indulging in when it comes to their god-belief. And no, non-believers are not constrained to doing the same, so long as they choose rational philosophy.

But rational philosophy, the philosophy of Objectivism, is precisely what believers do not want to consider. Indeed, does Sye consider the possibility that there is a rational alternative to his god-belief? Not that I can see.

Does Sye Ten Bruggencate present a genuine proof for the existence of “God”? Not if what is imaginary is distinct from what is real. If his god were real, why would Sye rely on the usual tactics of presuppositionalism to demonstrate its reality? I submit that he relies on these tactics precisely because his god is not real, and yet wants it to be real.

by Dawson Bethrick

Labels: Concepts, imagination, Knowledge, Logic, Morality, Presuppositional Gimmickry, rationality, Theistic Arguments, Universality

posted by Bahnsen Burner at 10:00 AM
198 Comments:

Blogger Ydemoc said...
Dawson,
Another superb job! I have read all of your writings (and comments). They are absolutely brilliant.
Ydemoc
August 27, 2010 8:41 PM
Blogger Sye TenB said...

Maybe someday I'll have the time to read all that.
erhaps a debate is in order sometime. What say?
August 27, 2010 9:17 PM
Blogger rhiggs said...

<pre>
    Great post Dawson.


    Maybe someday I'll have the time to read all that.

    Perhaps a debate is in order sometime. What say?

    As usual, Sye refuses to critically examine his own worldview, puffs his chest and dares his opponent to a debate.

    Why not just answer the criticisms here?

    Is this perhaps because you cannot even prove that you exist for certain without demolishing your argument...?
    August 28, 2010 6:57 AM
Blogger Bahnsen Burner said...

    Hello Sye,

    Thanks for visiting my site and leaving your comment.

    I must say that I have to agree with Rhiggs on this: why not take some time to examine my criticisms of your proof, and see if you can answer them? You might begin with explaining why you think “immaterial” is the proper category for the laws of logic, mathematics, science and morality, as opposed to *conceptual*.

    In my worldview, these things are conceptual in nature. If they are not conceptual in nature in your worldview, I’d have to say you have some major problems to sort out.

    For instance, to what does “immaterial” refer *positively*? It seems to tell us nothing more than what something *isn’t* as opposed to what it *is*, which is a non-starter since clearly it is supposed to refer to something that exists (and thus would need positive identification). Also, if “immaterial” refers to products of mental activity (as your own example of the concept ‘3’ indicates), then you’re essentially saying that “God” – by also categorizing it as “immaterial” – is a product of mental activity. But this would defeat your theism as a viable contender in any debate, since it can only mean that your god, far from being a concept (since it’s supposed to refer to a independently existing being that is sui generis), is very likely a product of imagination. In the final analysis, if the Christian god is imaginary, it is not real, therefore it does not exist. I give several reasons – which I think individually are quite compelling, and collectively overwhelming – for supposing that the Christian god is imaginary in nature in my article The Imaginative Nature of Christian Theism.

    On the other hand, if you do agree that the laws in question are conceptual in nature, then how do you account for that which is conceptual in nature when your worldview – Christianity – has no theory of concepts? Indeed, I would say that one of the reasons why you prefer to categorize these laws as “immaterial” is precisely because you do not have a *conceptual* understanding of them. Rather, you have a storybook understanding of them, courtesy of Van Til, Bahnsen & co. If you think Christianity does provide a theory of concepts, perhaps you could spell it out for us, explain how it is specifically Christian in nature, and show how it not only justifies your use of “immaterial” in the present context, but also how it addresses the concerns that I raise above.

    If you’re interested in other criticisms of presuppositionalism, I have written on the nature of knowledge (see here), logic (see here), numbers (see here), induction (see here), and morality (see here). Of course, these are just the tip of the iceberg, but if you’re interested in challenging my position, I’d say you have your work cut out for you.

    Regards,
    Dawson
    August 28, 2010 10:51 AM
Blogger Sye TenB said...

    I must say that I have to agree with Rhiggs on this: why not take some time to examine my criticisms of your proof, and see if you can answer them?

    Erm, cause I don't have the time to take right now. I just finished a baseball tournament, and am preparing for a live debate in NC this Thrusday. I will be away all week, and simply do not have the time to sift through such a long post. It's not like I haven't heard these criticisms before, or that you have not heard the resolutions, so I don't feel a pressing need to answer them. As I said, perhaps when I have the time I will get to this.

    Still though, if you are interested in a debate, perhaps we can schedule something.

    Cheers,

    Sye
    August 28, 2010 12:21 PM
Blogger Bahnsen Burner said...

    Sye: “I will be away all week, and simply do not have the time to sift through such a long post.”

    When you have time, and have something substantive to say in response to my criticisms, you know where to find me.

    Sye: “It's not like I haven't heard these criticisms before,”

    Where have you heard my criticisms before? Can you point us to a source which argues the points I’ve raised against presuppositionalism?

    If you've not read through my critique of your proof (you yourself have stated that you've not had any time to "sift through" my post), how could you know if you've already seen my criticisms before?

    Sye: “or that you have not heard the resolutions,”

    Actually, I find that presuppositionalists tend to do what you’re doing: they have only excuses for not interacting with my criticisms, rather than answers to them. I've certainly not seen any refutations of the papers I linked to in my previous comment. If you know of any, please let me know.

    Sye: “so I don't feel a pressing need to answer them.”

    But for some reason, you found sufficient need to post your comments. Interesting.

    Sye: “Still though, if you are interested in a debate, perhaps we can schedule something.”

    I frankly don’t see the point. And if you can't spare the time to read my post, it sounds like you’re already far too busy with other commitments anyway. I am very busy too, but I found time to refute your proof. Besides, I have already published many criticisms of presuppositionalism. If you have responses to them, just let me know what they are. Until then, your “proof” remains refuted.

    Regards,
    Dawson
    August 28, 2010 1:36 PM
Blogger Justin Hall said...

    I'd love to hear what the resolutions are. In fact I'll go so far as to say I have never heard of a sound response to the primary arguement from existense, nor can I concieve of one. So please Sye, if you are too busy fine, but at least post a link or something. I will read any arguement with great interest, altho always with an eye to spot stolen concept fallacies.
    August 28, 2010 2:03 PM
Blogger rhiggs said...

    "If you've not read through my critique of your proof (you yourself have stated that you've not had any time to "sift through" my post), how could you know if you've already seen my criticisms before?"


    Brilliant! Sye is caught red-handed lying. I will be linking straight to this comment in the future.

    Thanks
    August 28, 2010 2:40 PM
Blogger Sye TenB said...

    "If you've not read through my critique of your proof (you yourself have stated that you've not had any time to "sift through" my post), how could you know if you've already seen my criticisms before?"

    Erm, I skimmed it. Same ka ka, just more words. That is actually why I prefer a live debate, then you can't hide behind your keyboard. If and when I respond to your post, I do not plan to have a back and forth with someone who types so much, yet says so little.
    August 28, 2010 3:18 PM
Blogger Sye TenB said...

    In the meantime, why don’t you chew on this. You say:

    ”At Step Five the visitor is asked to decide whether those laws, whose existence he has just affirmed, are “immaterial” or “material.” It is at this point that I think Sye’s proof begins to suffer its most profound problems.”

    So, in order to get to step 5, you had to admit that there are laws of logic, mathematics, science, and absolute morality, how do you account for them according to your worldview? I don’t see the point of offering a refutation to steps that you should not have gotten to.

    Cheers.
    August 28, 2010 3:24 PM
Blogger Bahnsen Burner said...

    Sye wrote: “So, in order to get to step 5, you had to admit that there are laws of logic, mathematics, science, and absolute morality,”

    “admit”? Are you really that far behind in all this?

    Sye asked: “how do you account for them according to your worldview?”

    By means of the axioms, the primacy of existence and the objective theory of concepts. That’s how. (I thought you'd know this since you say it's the "same ka ka" you've seen so often already.)

    Rhiggs wrote: “Sye is caught red-handed lying.”

    Indeed, if I’m going to debate someone, he or she would at minimum need to be honest. Sye’s own statements suggest that he fails to meet this minimum requirement. Besides, if I’m going to debate someone, I’d want to debate someone who can deal with the criticisms that I raise rather than hiding behind contentless slogans he’s picked up from some apologetics book. Sye has not shown that he’s able to meet this requirement either.

    By the way, Sye, if you’re reading: in case you are unfamiliar with what Justin mentioned in his comment, here are some resources:

    The Argument from Existence by Anton Thorn

    Stolen Concepts and Intellectual Parasitism by little ol’ me

    In the meantime, Sye, one really quick question which should be a snap for you to answer since it's the "same ka ka" you've supposedly answered already:

    Can you explain how we can reliably distinguish between what you call "God" and what you may merely be imagining?

    Regards,
    Dawson
    August 28, 2010 3:42 PM
Blogger bc said...

    This should be good. Sye is out of his league.
    August 28, 2010 4:10 PM
Blogger Sye TenB said...

    "Indeed, if I’m going to debate someone, he or she would at minimum need to be honest."

    And with that, I am done with you. Surely a person can glean the contents of your objections by skimming a post? Such unsubstantiated allegations are usually trotted out by the likes of those, like you and rhiggs, who are too afraid to debate the issues live. They hide behind their keyboards and sling mud. Perhaps you, like rhiggs, saw what happened to the last person I debated. If that is the case, I understand your fear.

    If you ever get the courage to do a live debate, you know how to contact me.

    Cheers.
    August 28, 2010 4:27 PM
Blogger Sye TenB said...

    Looks like I got out just in time. "Proof by verbosity." Gotta love it :-)

    Cheers.
    August 28, 2010 4:43 PM
Blogger Bahnsen Burner said...

    I announced that a minimum requirement for me to debate someone, is that he or she be honest.

    At this point, Sye stated “with that, I am done with you.”

    By declaring my terms, my opponents self-eliminate. That’s classic!

    Water does indeed find its own level.

    Sye must have been doing some searching on the internet and linked to blog entry by David Smart. This is where Smart famously admits that, on his worldview, something is imaginary “only by the presuppositions and criteria he employs!” In other words, something is either real or imaginary depending on what “presuppositions” one adopts. On this view, I can imagine Blarko, but if I adopt the right presuppositions, Blarko becomes real. Amazing!

    For details, see my blog A Response to David Smart on Arrogance. And yes, I do love it!

    Meanwhile, I see that Sye has not addressed my question about how we can reliably distinguish between what he calls “God” and what he may merely be imagining. Then again, I wasn’t holding my breath.

    On that note, he’s not rebutted a single point that I’ve made in my blog. And he says I’m scared? Hmmmm... couldn't fool us.

    Regards,
    Dawson
    August 28, 2010 5:02 PM
Blogger Sye TenB said...

    "By declaring my terms, my opponents self-eliminate. That’s classic!"

    Um no, it was insinuating that I was a liar that did it.
    (There's probably a name for that tactic too, but I'm really liking "argumentum ad verbosium," now that's classic! :-))

    Cheers.
    August 28, 2010 5:12 PM
Blogger bc said...

    Thought you were done here, Sye. You've been asked a 20 word question. Doesn't seem all that verbose to me but I suppose that is all relative.

    Can you explain how we can reliably distinguish between what you call "God" and what you may merely be imagining?
    August 28, 2010 5:36 PM
Blogger Sye TenB said...

    "Can you explain how we can reliably distinguish between what you call "God" and what you may merely be imagining?"

    Simple, denying God reduces one's worldview to absurdity, denying what I may be imagining does not.

    Cheers.
    August 28, 2010 6:21 PM
Blogger Justin Hall said...

    Darn it! It now looks like i'll never see a refutation of the primary arguement from existence. Disapointed... yet again. C'mon Sye, one little old link?
    August 28, 2010 6:22 PM
Blogger Bahnsen Burner said...

    Sye,

    With each new comment of yours, you dig yourself deeper and deeper into chronic credibility deficit. If you came here to save face, you're not doing very well.

    Also, by dismissing my critique of your “proof” as an example of “argumentum ad verbosity,” you’re essentially announcing that you aren’t up to the task of interacting with a mere blog entry, while simultaneously disparaging painfully heavy tomes like Bahnsen’s Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings & Analysis, which weighs in at a whopping 700 pages of profuse repetitiousness. That’s the problem with arbitrary standards: you end up wiping out much more than you first intended.

    I asked: Can you explain how we can reliably distinguish between what you call "God" and what you may merely be imagining?

    Sye: “Simple, denying God reduces one's worldview to absurdity, denying what I may be imagining does not.”

    By denying your god, my worldview has not been reduced to absurdity. (I know, I just checked.) So this is not a reliable method at all. In fact, by your own statement, the fact that my worldview perseveres while I deny your god, suggests that your god is in fact imaginary, as I had suspected all along.

    Besides, one could make the claim you have made here about anything one imagines. Observe:

    A-blarkist: Can you explain how we can reliably distinguish between what you call “Blarko” and what you may merely be imagining?

    Blarkist: Simple, denying Blarko reduces one’s worldview to absurdity, denying what I may be imagining does not.

    Got anything better than canned apologetic sloganry?

    Regards,
    Dawson
    August 28, 2010 6:28 PM
Blogger Reynold said...

    Well, one of Sye's fanboys is at it again.

    Sigh...
    August 29, 2010 12:46 AM
Blogger Vagon said...

    Good job. Sye has heard these arguments before, I amongst many, many others have mentioned them to him in various comments around the place. I'm not saying he has addressed them, just that he has been asked them.

    I also wanted to add something into your critique of the website.

    It can be seen by clicking "laws of logic do not exist" it sends you on infinite regress until you agree that they exist. This is rightly performed by asking you how you can logically say logic doesn't exist.

    Considering we have come to this point without a particular god, there is no need to complicate the matter. Epistemology is governed by logic the defence of which is retortion.

    In other words Sye's own website has demonstrated how you can know something without god.
    August 29, 2010 5:02 PM
Blogger photosynthesis said...

    Sye said:

    "insinuating"

    Hahahahahahahahahahaaaaaa! No insinuations at all. Of course you are clearly dishonest Sye. I have witnessed you twisting and re-twisting people's comments and positions time and again.

    This is why you rather have a "live" debate, where twisting works best. All you have to do is make a mess (charged questions, such as "have you stop hitting your wife? But I never hit my ... aha! you would not have to deny it if it weren't true! But it is not t ... see what I am saying? [public applauds]") and wait for the other person try and disentangle the mess. On that kind of dishonest tricks, you are the utmost expert.

    You charlatan of charlatans. You prostitute for Jesus. Nah, you make Jesus into a prostitute too. Good job Sye.
    August 29, 2010 6:27 PM
Blogger Bahnsen Burner said...

    Vagon: “Sye has heard these arguments before, I amongst many, many others have mentioned them to him in various comments around the place. I'm not saying he has addressed them, just that he has been asked them.”

    Thanks for your comment, Vagon. Can you link to some examples? I’m interested specifically in seeing other critics of Sye’s or any other presuppositionalist’s arguments taking issue with his use of “immaterial” to characterize the laws of logic, for instance, and pointing out that it would be more appropriate to classify them as conceptual in nature. Who else has done this, and where? Who else has pointed out that Sye’s false dichotomies owe themselves to his worldview’s lack of a theory of concepts, and that correcting his understanding by reference to the objective theory of concepts would jeopardize his case for theism? Who else argues that by lumping both “God” and concepts into the same category (e.g., “immaterial”), the presuppositionalist is essentially telling us that his god is a product of his imagination (as opposed to an independently existing being), for the reasons that I cite in my blog?

    Where has Sye been challenged on these points specifically? I’d love to review such exchanges, if there are any.

    Regards,
    Dawson
    August 29, 2010 10:26 PM
Blogger Bahnsen Burner said...

    Photosynthesis wrote: “This is why you rather have a "live" debate, where twisting works best. All you have to do is make a mess (charged questions, such as "have you stop hitting your wife? But I never hit my ... aha! you would not have to deny it if it weren't true! But it is not t ... see what I am saying? [public applauds]") and wait for the other person try and disentangle the mess. On that kind of dishonest tricks, you are the utmost expert.”

    In general, I am not very interested in (or impressed by) public debates over, say, the existence of a god. For one thing, I am unpersuaded that they can accomplish much of anything of value. I can understand why some would consider such debates are irrational. Also, public debates often tend to be more about showmanship and style than ideas and content. There are exceptions, but it’s very easy for them to degrade to such level, especially when one’s opponent is arguing on behalf of an irrational position (such as Christianity).

    I get the strong impression that, in presuppositionalist circles, public debates are really an occasion for hero-apologetes to pound their chests in an effort to intimidate and humiliate their opponents before a crowd, especially by causing them to trip over their own words and/or barraging them with questions which they have difficulty answering on the fly (since those questions typically cannot be answered by canned slogans, which the apologist has in great abundance). Many apologists practice debating tactics which are intended to do precisely this, and thus have already made a determination not to listen very carefully to what his opponent may say before the debate has even begun. That’s why it is so refreshing when a contender leaves the apologist doubled-over in defeat, such as when George H. Smith had his radio debate with Greg Bahnsen. In that debate, Smith held Bahnsen’s feet to the fire by focusing on the latter’s pre-packaged claims. Presuppers like to talk about the Bahnsen-Stein debate, but you don’t find them talking much about this one.

    [continued...]
    August 29, 2010 10:30 PM
Blogger Bahnsen Burner said...

    As for Sye himself, I think the reasons for suspecting him of dishonesty were pretty clear in his own comments. In his first comment, he stated “Maybe someday I'll have the time to read all that,” which I think makes it clear that he had not read my blog. In his second comment, he stated that he “simply do[es] not have the time to sift through such a long post.” In stating this, he confirms what his earlier comment indicated: that he hasn’t read my blog.

    At the same time, he stated “It's not like I haven't heard these criticisms before…” This statement made me wonder how he could know what criticisms I had laid out in my blog since he had already gone to the trouble twice to say that he hasn’t read it. The two statements seem in direct conflict with each other: on the one hand, he hasn’t read what I’ve written; on the other, he knows what I have presented in what I’ve written.

    When called on what very much appears to be a contradiction, Sye said that he “skimmed it,” and later huffed, “Surely a person can glean the contents of your objections by skimming a post?”

    Sye was initially trying to say two things: first, that I had written “such a long post” that it couldn’t possibly worth his time to take it seriously, and second, that I’ve presented nothing new in my critiques of his proof, it’s the “same ka ka,” again not worth his time to examine. In other words, he sought to reply with dismissive insults and scornful arrogance. Meanwhile, he makes it clear that he would prefer to engage me in a verbal debate, so that I “can’t hide behind [my] keyboard” (as if I’m “hiding” by posting my writings on an internet site and interacting with my readers' comments).

    To answer Sye’s question, “skimming” a paper and examining it carefully are two different things. I’m sure Sye would agree with this. Can one glean the contents of objections by skimming? Typically I wouldn’t suppose that skimming is very reliable. But maybe Sye’s a really good skimmer. Meanwhile, I’ve asked him to point us to where he’s seen my particular criticisms before, and so far he’s not produced. Even worse, if he’s aware of the criticisms I’ve raised against his proof, why hasn’t he revised it so as to avoid making the mistakes I’ve pointed out? Again, I gather that he has credibility issues.

    Another point: I had stated that I will not debate someone who is dishonest. Upon announcing my policy, Sye indicated that he’s “done with” me. I was only going by what Sye had stated about himself – that he had not read my blog, and noted that this conflicted with his claim to know the content of my criticisms of his “proof.” But I did not need this to suspect Sye of dishonesty. I could tell from his “proof” that he’s dishonest, and I think some of my criticisms demonstrate this. His proof seeks to establish his god’s existence by means of cheap gimmicks and sleight of hand. An honest man does not rely on such tactics. Many of these gimmicks and devices are on display on Sye’s multimedia page, where he has four videos of a conversation he had with Eric Hovind, the president of some “creation science” organization.

    Really, I don’t know how anyone could be persuaded by anything he has to say.

    Lastly, if Sye’s “answer” to my question about how we can reliably distinguish between what he calls “God” and what he may merely be imagining is any indication of his intellectual prowess, it would be better to wait for a more challenging opponent.

    Regards,
    Dawson
    August 29, 2010 10:37 PM
Blogger Vagon said...

    We're going back a time now but here's a post I made over at weAreSMRT not regarding Sye specifically.

    http://wearesmrt.com/bb/viewtopic.php?f=17&t=609

    And here again talking with "scmike" a pesupper in the comments on Comforts blog:

    https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=5823596693953871104&postID=4322938360313106509

    When I request a positive ontology, thats the questioning of the immaterial.

    I should point out that I probably would say these days that I do have certainty in that it is contextual. So I let the ball drop :)

    I doubt you'll find specifically the wording you used in any case but the underlying principles are there.

    In any case I'll try to find the convos I've had with Sye specifically.
    August 29, 2010 11:03 PM
Blogger Vagon said...

    Found the one I was thinking of, starts with induction as a means for knowledge and proceeds painfully into page 3 in amongst the 640 or so posts.

    http://debunkingatheists.blogspot.com/2008/12/evolution-gets-owned.html?commentPage=2

    And this is a brief criticism of anselms ontological argument with further commenting on the need for a positive ontology:

    http://wearesmrt.com/bb/viewtopic.php?f=17&t=614

    I can keep going, but I feel like I'm spamming your blog,

    Cheers,
    Vagon.
    August 29, 2010 11:33 PM

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http://web.archive.org/web/20101018033927/http://debunkingatheists.blogspot.com/2008/12/evolution-gets-owned.html?commentPage=2


=== Links ===
http://web.archive.org/web/20110328061638/http://patientandpersistant.blogspot.com/  Blog followed by Sye on presup. 

http://patientandpersistant.blogspot.com/
[[Category:Presuppositionalism]]
[[Category:Logical fallacies]]
[[Category:Induction]]